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THE UNITED STATES: HOW TO DEAL WITH
UNCOVERED FUTURE SOCIAL SECURITY
LIABILITIES
Edward M. Gramlich2
The U.S. Social Security system, first formed back in the
1930s, is a government defined benefit pension program
financed by worker payroll taxes. As workers pay in their
SThis text was originally published in the Mel Week conference volume at
the Kiel Institute of World Economics entitled "Redesigning Social Security,"
Symposium 1997, Editor Horst Siebert.
' Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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payroll taxes, they accumulate benefit credits. At any point in
time, one can make some economic and demographic
assumptions, project forward tax inflows and benefit outflows,
and determine the long-run actuarial soundness of the system,
or really the long-term consistency of the present set of tax and
benefit schedules.
Every year, such forecasts are made by the Social Security
and Medicare trustees-three cabinet officers, the commissioner
of Social Security, and two outside members. Although earlier
Social Security legislation mandated that quadrennial outside
advisory councils be appointed to review these forecasts and to
comment on relevant policy issues, the last such council to
examine the retirement system was the Greenspan
Commission in 1983. But a new advisory council was formed in
1994 and I was asked to chair it. It included three members
from business, three from unions, and various others from the
private pension industry, the self-employment sector,
independent representatives, and so forth, making thirteen
members in all. We met monthly from mid-1994 to mid-1996,
commissioned a number of special studies, appointed two
technical panels that made reports, and in January 1997
issued our own report (Advisory Council 1997). In this paper I
discuss this report, particularly trying to promote the proposal
I put forward for dealing with the uncovered future liabilities
of Social Security.
1. UNCOVERED LIABILrrIEs
The council's main point of departure was the annual reports
of the Trustees of Social Security (see, for example, Trustees'
Report 1997). As has been widely reported in the U.S. press,
the intermediate assumptions of this report had the combined
assets of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) trust funds going below the safety level, a year's
worth of benefits, in 2029. The assets of the Medicare
Hospitalization Insurance (HI) Trust Fund, a separate entity
that we did not examine, were projected to go below the safety
level in 2001, a far more urgent situation. But since the past
convention was that these trust funds should be actuarially
sound for 75 years, the fact that the OASDI trust fund assets
were projected to go below the safety level as soon as 2029 was
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alarming enough. The sum total of future Social Security
liabilities stands now at $2.5 trillion, 34 percent of current
GDP, and it would take an immediate 18 percent increase in
the OASDI payroll tax to eliminate this long-term actuarial
imbalance.
With both the OASDI and HI trust funds, the underlying
demographics of the country are such that projected benefits
are rising rapidly compared to payroll tax inflows, so that once
the fund assets first go below the safety level at some future
date, say 2029, the funds will be increasingly far out of
actuarial balance after that date. In that sense, $2.5*trillion is
an underestimate of future uncovered liabilities, as is the 18
percent payroll tax deficiency.
These numbers reflect two deeper pension-saving issues
for the United States. One involves actuarial balance. In a
stable defined benefit social security system with pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) financing, the underlying accounting identity can be
written as:
[1] t=(B/W) - (S/N) = r -d,
where t is the OASDI tax rate on taxable wages, B is average
social security benefits, W is average taxable wages, S is the
number of social security recipients, and N is the number of
workers. The overall numerator, (B - S), is aggregate social
security benefits. The overall denominator, (W • N), is aggre-
gate taxable wages, with the overall right-hand side equaling
the payroll tax rate because of the PAYG identity. This
identity can also be written as the product of the aggregate
replacement rate, (r = B/W), and the dependency ratio, (d =
SIN).
The United States now has an aging population, with
people living longer and not having enough babies to stabilize
the population share of young people. This means that the
dependency ratio, d, is steadily rising, from about 0.29 today to
about 0.56 by the end of the 75-year forecast period. According
to the PAYG identity, if nothing is done to aggregate
replacement rates, the payroll tax rate must rise steadily to
pay for the existing defined benefit Social Security plan.
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Figure 1, which compares OASDI payroll tax inflows with
projected future benefit outflows, all as a percent of taxable
payrolls, gives the income flow statement for the OASDI trust
funds. These same numbers converted to asset stock form, and
shown as the ratio of the asset stocks as a percent of annual
outflows-the so-called trust fund ratio-are shown in Figure
2.
Figure I - OASI Income Rates and Cost Rates (as a pe*cetatge of t=xable
payroll)'
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Source: Trustees of Social Security (1997).
Figure 2 - Trust Fund Ratios for OASI and DI Trust Funds. Combined (assets
as a percentage of annual expenditures)a
cMw,"ra yeW
3 For legend and source see Figure 1.
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The second issue involves the rate of return. Another
property of a PAYG system, first pointed out by Paul
Samuelson, is that the equilibrium real rate of return on
worker contributions equals the rate of growth of the
economy's real wage base (real wages times number of
workers). This real wage base is slated to grow about 1 percent
in the long-term forecasts of the Trustees, which means that
younger cohorts will be increasingly getting fewer discounted
benefits relative to their discounted tax payments (using the
overall real interest rate of 2.3 percent as the discount factor).
Money's worth ratios, the ratio of discounted benefits to
discounted taxes paid by employees and employers on behalf of
employees, can be computed for past and future cohorts.
Taking into account the redistribution within Social
Security, spousal benefits and the likely share of families
receiving them, disability insurance levels and the likely share
of families receiving them, and survivor's benefit levels and the
likely share of families receiving them, the weighted average
money's worth ratios for people born in different past and
future years are shown in Figure 3. For people born before
1930, overall money's worth ratios are well above 1.0,
Figure 3 - Present Value of Expected OASDI Benefits as a Percentage of the
Prcent Value of Expected Contributions of Alternative Social
Security Systems. by Year of Birth for Grand Composite Workersa
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aT he figure refers to the Pay-As-You-Go sys:ern under Prcent Law
(PL PAYG). the P,-r-.onat Security Acc"ounts (PSA) plan, the Individual Ac-
count; (IA) plan, and the Maintain Benefit (MiB) plan. See text for further de-
' tails.
Source: Advisory Council C 1997).
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meaning that on average Social Security was a much better
investment than government bonds. For people born in the
early 1930s and retiring now, overall money's worth ratios are
about 1.0-meaning that Social Security has been
approximately as good a financial investment as government
bonds. For all of these age cohorts, Social Security should be a
very attractive proposition-it gives social protection for low-
wage and disabled workers and survivor's insurance, and still
a decent financial return. Typically, Social Security is indeed
very popular with these age groups.
But the story is very different for younger workers. While
the overall money's worth ratio cycles a bit because of past
movements in real interest rates, over the long run the
aggregate money's worth ratio is slated to fall for younger
workers, even before any policy changes in OASDI replacement
or tax rates are made. With the necessary policy changes to
bring the system into actuarial balance, these money's worth
ratios would become lower yet. One reflection of this fact is
shown in Figure 3. The line labeled "PL (present law) PAYG"
assumes that Social Security is operated in the future as it has
been for the most part in the 20th century-by raising payroll
taxes as need be to finance present law benefits. Not
surprisingly, these money's worth ratios drop to about 0.7 and
falling. Not surprisingly, poll results find Social Security to be
a much less attractive proposition for younger workers.
The interaction between these two issues sets up a
difficult problem in political economics. Taxes could be raised
or replacement ratios cut to keep the system in long-term
PAYG balance. But the mere act of doing that worsens the
money's worth ratios for younger cohorts and threatens the
future popularity of the Social Security system. The question of
how to bring the system into financial balance while
preserving its political popularity was the central issue faced
by the Advisory Council.
2. NEW APPROACHES
The council had three different approaches for dealing with
these twin problems. Each approach takes advantage of the
macroeconomic proposition that future returns on both stocks
and bonds are likely to exceed the implicit PAYG return
[Vol. 64: 3
19981 UNCOVERED FUTURE SOCIAL SECURITY LIABILITIES 745
of the present OASDI system. Two of the approaches take
advantage of the additional macroeconomic proposition that
the best way to insure a healthy retirement system in the 21st
century is to raise retirement, and national, saving now.
One approach, known as the Maintain Benefits (MB) plan,
involves minimal changes in benefit schedules, tax rates, and
hence underlying rates of national saving. The trust fund
finances would be preserved, and the money's worth ratios for
younger workers raised (see the MB line in Figure 3), by a
huge investment of Social Security funds in equities (combined
with the forecasting projection that the returns on common
stock would continue to exceed those on bonds). There are a
number of institutional and political difficulties with such an
approach, and in fact in the end those favoring the MB
approach only wanted to "study" central fund equity
investment, not actually do it. From a macroeconomic point of
view, the most telling criticism of the MB approach is that it
requires virtually no new national saving, and hence basically
entails an asset swap with the private sector. In the end the
OASDI trust funds would hold more stocks and fewer bonds,
and private savers would hold fewer stocks and more bonds.
But the country would be no richer in the long run because
there would have been no new wealth creation.
A second approach, called the Personal Security Accounts
(PSA) plan, involves a replacement of the present defined
benefit system with large-scale defined contributions held
outside the OASDI trust fund, similar to the Chilean system.
These accounts would be privately owned and managed, hence
increasing their riskiness. The OASDI benefit schedule would
revert to a poverty-line flat benefit, again increasing the risk
that individuals who did not invest well would not receive
many retirement benefits. Since the present day payroll tax
would be largely diverted to the personal accounts of
individuals, there would also need to be a huge amount of
transition financing-new borrowing and new taxes-for such
a plan.
From a macroeconomic point of view the problem here is
arbitrage. Basically, the government would be doing a huge
amount of transition borrowing so that individuals could invest
in their higher-yielding PSA accounts. The money's worth
ratios turn out to be highest for this plan (see the PSA line in
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Figure 3), but these can be misleading because of the
arbitrage, and because the money's worth ratios are
expectations, with a large potential variance because of the
investment risk.
3. THE INDIVIDUAL AccouNTs PLAN
I personally do not favor either approach and have come
up with an intermediate approach that preserves the
important social protections of the present Social Security
system, does this in a financially prudent way without relying
on OASDI equity investment or arbitrage, and still adds what
I consider to be badly needed new saving for retirement. My
Individual Accounts (IA) plan does all three.
The first component of the IA plan is what might be called
kind and gentle benefit cuts. These cuts would really be cuts in
the real growth of benefits over time for high-wage workers,
with disabled and low-wage workers being largely protected
from any cuts. The IA plan would include some technical
changes such as including all state and local new hires in
Social Security and applying consistent income tax treatment
to Social Security benefits. These changes are also part of the
council's other plans, and go some way to eliminating Social
Security's actuarial deficit.
Then, beginning in the 21st century, the changes would be
supplemented with two other measures. There would be a
slight increase in the normal retirement age for all workers.
Under present law this normal retirement age is already slated
to rise from age 65 to age 67 during the next century: the
change would speed up this schedule, and also index it to the
overall rise in life expectancy later on in the 21st century.
There would also be a slight change in the benefit formula to
reduce the growth of real Social Security benefits for high-
wage workers. Both of these changes would be phased in very
gradually to avoid actual benefit cuts for present retirees and
"notches" in the benefit schedule (instances when younger
workers with the same earnings records get lower real benefits
than older workers). The result of all changes would be a
modest reduction in the overall OASDI replacement rate of
equation [1] to leave OASDI payroll tax rates stable into the
future. When combined with the rising number of retirees, the
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share of the nation's output devoted to Social Security
spending would be approximately the same as at present,
eliminating this part of the impending explosion in future U.S.
entitlement spending. Of the three plans suggested by our
council, this IA plan is clearly the best for achieving short- and
long-term balance in the U.S. federal budget.
These benefit cuts alone would mean that high-wage
workers would not be experiencing rising real benefits as their
real wages grow, so the IA plan would supplement these
changes with another measure to raise overall retirement (and
national) saving. Workers would be required to contribute an
extra 1.6 percent of their pay to their defined contribution
individual accounts. These accounts would be owned by
workers but centrally managed. Workers would be able to
allocate their funds among five to ten broad mutual funds
covering stocks and bonds. Central management of the funds
would cut down the risk that funds would be invested
unwisely, would cut administrative costs, and would mean that
Wall Street firms would not find these individual accounts a
financial bonanza. The funds would be converted to real
annuities on retirement, to protect against inflation and the
chance that retirees would overspend in their early retirement
years.
All changes together would mean that approximately the
presently scheduled level of benefits would be paid to all wage
classes of workers, of all ages. The difference between this
outcome and present law is that under this IA plan these
benefits would be affordable, as they are not under present
law. The changes would eliminate Social Security's long-term
actuarial deficit while still holding together the important
retirement safety net provided by Social Security. They would
significantly raise the return on investment contributions for
younger workers. They would slow the growth of overall
entitlement spending and improve the federal budget outlook,
even in the near term. And, since the changes would involve
neither asset swaps nor arbitrage, the changes would move
beyond the present PAYG financing scheme, by building up the
nation's capital stock in advance of the baby boom retirement
crunch.
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